There exists an alternative, game-theoretic way of interpreting these connective results.
These include game-theoretic models based on the “prisoner’s dilemma” (PD), dynamic mathematical models based on the Richardson model, and economic models frequently based on a “utility-maximizing” framework.
Navarro opened the memo by writing, “If the probability of a pandemic is greater than roughly 1%, a game-theoretic analysis of the coronavirus indicates the clear dominant strategy is an immediate travel ban on China.”
Game-theoretic dynamics of the sub-person receive deep but accessible reflection in Ainslie (2001).
In other words, logical evaluation games for classical logic are determined in the game-theoretic sense.
To be sure, game theoretic models do assume that the structure of the game is common knowledge (though, see Section 5.3).
Yet this does surprisingly little to change the situation from a classical game-theoretic point of view.
The name Game-Theoretic Semantics, GTS for short, has come to be used to cover both of these extensions.
A major source of independent, game-theoretic perspectives on logic is the game semantics of computational logics.
Requiring that fitness in cultural evolutionary game theoretic models conform to this interpretative constraint severely limits the kinds of problems that one can address.
If evolutionary game theoretic models do not explain the etiology of a social phenomenon, presumably they explain the persistence of the phenomenon or the normativity attached to it.
If agents imitate the most successful strategy, a population will thus immediately go to All Defect—a game-theoretic image of Hobbes’ war of all against all, perhaps.
With the help of some auxiliary devices, the three modalities can define the central game-theoretic notion of a Nash equilibrium (Harrenstein 2004; van der Hoek & Pauly 2007).
Newer game-theoretic analyses of state of nature scenarios in Hobbes appear in Vanderschraaf (2006) and Chung (2015), extended with simulation to include Locke and Nozick in Bruner (forthcoming).
In computational simulations, game-theoretic cooperation has been appealed to as a model for aspects of both ethics in the sense of Sidgwick and social-political philosophy on the model of Hobbes.
Binmore (1994) forcefully argues that this line of criticism confuses game theory as mathematics with questions about which game theoretic models are most typically applicable to situations in which people find themselves.
., offers a game-theoretic semantics for classical as well as for intuitionistic logic: a formula counts as valid if a proponent who states this formula has a winning strategy over possible attacks an opponent is allowed to realize.
As mentioned, the game-theoretic semantics for dependence logic is a variant of the imperfect-information semantics for independence-friendly logic, which is itself an adaptation of the game-theoretic semantics of first-order logic.
Finally, we should note that while model theory and proof theory are the most prominent contenders for the explication of logical consequence, there are alternative frameworks for formal semantics such as algebraic semantics, game-theoretic semantics and dynamic semantics (see Wansig 2000).
Section 6 of this entry has been adapted with minor changes from “Game-Theoretic Accounts of Social Norms”, by Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso, in The Handbook of Experimental Game Theory, Mónica Capra, Rachel Croson, Tanya Rosenblatt, and Mary Rigdon (eds.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.
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Section 6 of this entry has been adapted with minor changes from Game-Theoretic Accounts of Social Norms by Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso in The Handbook of Experimental Game Theory Mónica Capra Rachel Croson Tanya Rosenblatt and Mary Rigdon eds Cheltenham Edward Elgar Publishing forthcoming