Sentence examples for Humean from high-quality English sources.

• Some perdurantists stick with perdurantism, but reject Humean Supervenience.

• Humean skepticism was perhaps what generated Peruvian interest in modern skepticism.

• In this section we'll look at how he attempted to locate the nomic in the Humean mosaic.

• The desire papers (1988a, 1996b) are also about the Humean view that motivation requires both a belief and a desire.

• So Lewis's defence of Humean supervenience then generalises into a defence of the compatibility of large swathes of folk theory with ideal physics.

• Ignacio Ávila (Colombia) (1996) explored this same vein, while Carlos Patarroyo (Colombia) sides with the Kantian position against Humean skepticism.

• Lotze therefore utilizes Humean-style arguments, without thereby concurring with Humean conclusions (in particular Hume’s radical psychologism).

• Kant begins, in § 27, by stating that “here is now the place to remove the Humean doubt from the ground up” (4, 310; 63); and he continues, in § 29, by proposing

Use Humean in a sentence.

• The second response to the pushing argument is to charge that it rests on a naive (pre-Humean) conception of causation as requiring some sort of metaphysical push or “oomph”.

• The story now on offer says explicitly that perception relates to thought roughly as Humean “impressions” relate to Humean “ideas” (191d; compare Hume, First Enquiry II).

• A second philosophical topic is the connection between a CA-world and one of the most famous and controversial contemporary metaphysical theses, namely David Lewis’ Humean Supervenience (HS).

• According to one tradition, typically called ‘Humean’ or ‘Neo-Humean’, the existence of reasons to act depends on the existence of desires possessed by the agent who would act.

• A different line of response to this worry (Shoemaker 1984d, 2001) is to deny the Humean account of causation altogether, and contend that causal relations are themselves metaphysically necessary, but this remains a minority view.

• In two papers, Earman and Roberts (2005a and b) first address how to best formulate the thesis of Humean supervenience, then they argue based on skeptical considerations that their brand of Humean supervenience is true.

• There is a persistent supposition – see, for example, (Gilson 1937) – that Ockham, and many of his fourteenth-century followers, had a basically Humean position on causality; this supposition has deep historical roots (Nadler 1996), but is inaccurate (Adams 1987, pp. 741ff.).

• Thus, Kant’s “complete solution of the Humean problem” directly involves him with his whole revolutionary theory of the constitution of experience by the a priori concepts and principles of the understanding—and with his revolutionary conception of synthetic a priori judgments.

Humean sentence examples

• The supposedly Humean position has three basic assertions: that there is nothing more to causality than the regular sequence of phenomena, that such a regular sequence cannot give a necessary connection, and that, consequently, we can have no certain knowledge of causal relations.

• The Humean Theory of Reasons, along with other Actual State versions of internalism, is philosophically important because of a Central Problem motivating much ethical theorizing since the 1940s, which derives from a tension between HTR, Moral Rationalism (see section 1.1), and Moral Absolutism:

• Here a Humean might draw comfort from her explanatory theory: if our most robust actual moral intuitions are explained by the sentimental responses we have when we approximate the Common Point of View, as the Humean claims, it is after all highly unlikely that the anyone who successfully occupies that perspective would approve of something we actually find a paradigmatic moral wrong, such as genocide.

• One attraction of doing so – at least for him – is that it fits within a broadly Humean agenda: since causation is a modal notion, it threatens the thesis of Humean supervenience (Lewis 1986a, ix) unless it can somehow we cashed out in terms of similarity relations between worlds, where those similarity relations do not appeal in turn to causal (or other Humean supervenience-violating) features of worlds.