Sentence examples for Kekes from high-quality English sources.

• (Kekes 1998, 217).

• The authorities confiscated his motorbike after suddenly banning two- and three-wheeled taxis, known as okadas (after a now-defunct airline, for their ability to soar over traffic) and kekes.

• (See Code 1983, 268–282; Kekes 1983, 512–516.)

• ., Kekes 2005; Card 2010; Formosa 2008 and 2013).

• Kekes’ argument relies on at least two crucial assumptions.

• ., Card 2002, 20; Kekes 1990, 48; 1998, 217; 2005, 3; Stone 2009, 23).

• ., Barry 2013, 87; Kekes 2005, 2; Thomas 1993, 82; Russell 2014, 180).

• ., Card 2002; Kekes 2005; Calder 2013; Formosa 2013; Goldberg forthcoming).

Use Kekes in a sentence.

• Indeed, some believe the search for such a principle to be pointless (Wolf 1997b, 12–13; Kekes 2000; Schmidtz 2001).

• It also captures an important aspect of views defended by Nozick, Plato, Garrett, Kekes, Maxwell, Ryan, and Tiberius.

• Conservatives seek to “preserve the political arrangements…shown to be conducive to good lives”, writes Kekes (1997: 351–2).

• Conservatives, in contrast, regard human nature as weak and fallible, unalterably selfish rather than altruistic (Kekes 1997: 368).

• Card and Kekes argue that it is more dangerous to ignore evil than to try to understand it (Card 2002 and 2010; Kekes 1990).

• ., Kekes 2005), while others believe that evildoing can result from many different sorts of motives, even good motives (see e.g., Card 2002).

• Tradition represents for conservatives a continuum enmeshing the individual and social, and is immune to reasoned critique; the radical intellectual is therefore arrogant and dangerous (Kekes 1997: 365).

• Kekes argues similarly that conservatism, with its defining scepticism and opposition to “rationalism” in politics, contrasts with liberalism and socialism in rejecting a priori value-commitments (Kekes 1997: 368).

Kekes sentence examples

• For Kekes, conservatism adopts a stance of scepticism between extremes of rationalism and fideism (belief based on faith), and steers a middle course of pessimism between claims of perfectibility and corruptibility (1998: 54, 89, 60).

• Similarly, certain sorts of partiality directed toward other people – friends, family members, and the like – are also forbidden by consequentialist impartiality, but regarded as justifiable, and in many cases admirable, from the standpoint of common sense (Blum 1980, Cottingham 1983, Kekes 1981, Keller 2013, Slote 1985).

• Kekes expresses a similar view in condemning race-based affirmative action as “arbitrary” (1995: 200), and, in the same vein, Flew argues that racism is unjust because it treats persons on the basis of traits that “are strictly superficial and properly irrelevant to all, or almost all, questions of social status and employability” (1990: 63–64).

• Writers do not always make the distinction between foundational and other forms of pluralism, but as well as Thomson and Ross, at least Bernard Williams (1981), Charles Taylor (1982), Charles Larmore (1987), John Kekes (1993), Michael Stocker (1990 and 1997), David Wiggins (1997) and Christine Swanton (2001) are all committed to foundational pluralism.