Third, it has been suggested that the content of perception is unit-free (Peacocke 1986).
Arthur Peacocke, in full Arthur Robert Peacocke, (born Nov. 29, 1924, Watford, Eng.
Drawing on Peacocke, Paul (2012) develops a reasons account of how we know our intentions.
(Earlier defenses of experience-conceptualism are found in Craig (1976) and Peacocke (1983)).
Peacocke (1983) gave three examples of this kind, Block (1995, 1996) a few others; for discussion of those, see Lycan (1996).
Like Bermúdez and Hurley, Peacocke sees Gibson’s analysis of vision as illuminating a basic form of nonconceptual self-consciousness.
The reasons account of self-knowledge, first advanced by Peacocke (1999), combines elements of internalism and elements of externalism.
“It is possible for one and the same concept to receive different mental representations in different individuals” (Peacocke 1992, p. 3).
In our example, the sound comes from the left, relative to the origin in the subject's body, which Peacocke proposes is the middle of the chest.
Yet as concerns the incompatibilist’s reductio, it is unclear if any externalist accepts it as an anti-skeptical argument (though see Peacocke 1996, p. 152).
Peacocke was initially unconvinced by this line of argument (Peacocke 1994), but subsequently changed his mind (Peacocke 2002).
Like demonstrative expressions, demonstrative concepts pick out different things on different occasions, and as Peacocke sees it the role of experience is to anchor a demonstrative concept to its referent.
Christopher Peacocke (Peacocke 1999, p. 154) charges Rosen’s modal fictionalist with “fetishism” unless the fictionalist can say what is so distinctive about the particular fiction chosen.
Peacocke has objected to Cussins’ construction-theoretic content that there appear to be cases where subjects lack the abilities to move to the locations presented in experience, for instance due to paralysis.
The two most influential theories that have sought to define this experience more precisely than Wollheim does are due to Christopher Peacocke and Robert Hopkins, and the principal concept both employ is that of experienced resemblance.
One debate in this area (already mentioned in connection with spatial representation) is whether a visual experience's representing things as occupying three dimensions suffices to represent things as mind-independent (see Strawson 1958, Peacocke 1983, Smith 2002).
In the secondary literature, see Beyssade (1993), Broughton (2002), Carriero (2009), Cunning (2007), Curley (1978), Frankfurt (1966), Hintikka (1962), Kenny (1968), Markie (1992), Peacocke (2012), Sarkar (2003), Stroud (2008), Vendler (1984), Vinci (1998), Williams (1978), and Wilson (1978).
Some of the most influential intentional theories are Anscombe (1965), Armstrong (1968), Pitcher (1970), Peacocke (1983), Harman (1990), Tye (1992, 1995), Dretske (1995), Lycan (1996); for more recent accounts, see Byrne (2001), Siegel (2010), Pautz (2010) and the entry on the contents of perception.
To account for this difference in the way in which the same object is perceptually represented Peacocke argues that there is an additional layer of nonconceptual content that he calls proto-propositional content, which involves objects, properties, and relations rather than concepts (Peacocke 1992).
Peacocke himself eventually accepted the Autonomy Thesis on the grounds that the capacities mentioned in the conditions for a state to have genuine objective spatial content do not necessitate a conceptual notion of the first-person; indeed, he agrees with Bermúdez that these capacities can be accounted for nonconceptually and without involving any first-person notion (Peacocke 2002).
On this page, there are 20 sentence examples for Peacocke. They are all from high-quality sources and constantly processed by lengusa's machine learning routines.
Just use the " " button to fragment sentence examples and start your learning flow.
Example output from one of your searches:
Peacocke himself eventually accepted the Autonomy Thesis on the grounds that the capacities mentioned in the conditions for a state to have genuine objective spatial content do not necessitate a conceptual notion of the first-person indeed he agrees with Bermúdez that these capacities can be accounted for nonconceptually and without involving any first-person notion Peacocke 2002