Science did not develop in accordance with Popper's model.
She also meets Popper's former student, John Worrall and string theoretician David Tong.
This bears out Popper's original analysis which introduced his term 'conspiracy theory': there is no actual 'theory' to argue logically against, it is a psychological disorder in which multiple absurd beliefs are held even when they would mutually exclude and contradict each other.
Axiom (5) is crucial and older than its use in Popper's theory.
The argument was entirely in line with Popper's approach, as well as with his conclusions.
Indeed Popper's original ordering satisfies the strictures of both content and likeness approaches.
Hence LIN is—in Popper's sense—more falsifiable, and hence should be preferred as the default hypothesis.
That, at least, was Popper's litmus test for acceptability and what primarily motivated his original proposal.
Popper's ideas, he remarks, were also similar to those of another Viennese philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein (!)
With this criterion they can accommodate a range of intuitive judgments in the simple weather framework that Popper's account cannot.
On these more inclusive characterizations, Popper's theory qualifies as a content account; Tichý's theory qualifies as a likeness account.
The second is that, like Popper's original proposal, it judges no false proposition to be closer to the truth than any truth, including logical truths.
Taking a leaf out of Popper's book, Hilpinen argued that closeness to the whole truth is in part a matter of degree of informativeness of a proposition.
(Popper's content approach, whatever else its shortcomings, can be applied in principle to theories expressible in any language, no matter how sophisticated.)
Since here we are dealing with events, the axioms are simpler than in the previous presentation following Popper's axioms (which assign probabilities to sentences rather than events).
While it avoids the relative worthlessness of falsehoods, Hilpinen's account, just like Popper's, entails the absolute worthlessness of all falsehoods: no falsehood is closer to the truth than any truth.
Popper's own autobiography, unfortunately, tells us nothing about their meeting or their relationship, despite the fact that he was to be the largest single influence (first positive, then negative) on Feyerabend's work.
In 1952, Feyerabend presented his ideas on scientific change to Popper's LSE seminar and to a gathering of illustrious Wittgensteinians (Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, H.L.A.Hart and Georg Henrik von Wright) in Anscombe's Oxford flat.
In the wake of the collapse of Popper's articulation of the content approach two philosophers, working quite independently, suggested a radically different approach: one which takes the likeness in truthlikeness seriously (Tichý 1974, Hilpinen 1976).
With this restriction to relevant consequences we can basically apply Popper's definitions: one theory is more truthlike than another if its relevant truth content is larger and its relevant falsity content no larger; or its relevant falsity content is smaller, and its relevant truth content is no smaller.
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With this restriction to relevant consequences we can basically apply Popper's definitions one theory is more truthlike than another if its relevant truth content is larger and its relevant falsity content no larger or its relevant falsity content is smaller and its relevant truth content is no smaller