Here is a sorites argument for the elimination of stones:
Such a Set, with the last Conclusion tacked on, is called a ‘Sorites’; the original Set of Propositions is called its ‘Premisses’; each of the intermediate Conclusions is called a ‘Partial Conclusion’ of the Sorites; the last Conclusion is called its ‘Complete Conclusion,’ or, more briefly, its ‘Conclusion’; the Genus, of which all the Terms are Species, is called its ‘Universe of Discourse’, or, more briefly, its ‘Univ.’; the Terms, used as Eliminands in the Syllogisms, are called its ‘Eliminands’; and the two Terms, which are retained, and therefore appear in the Conclusion, are called its ‘Retinends’.
The basic problem is that contextualism is a psychologistic theory of the sorites.
If vague terms were literally indexical, the sorites monger would have a strong reply.
They develop an analogy between the sorites paradox and indexical sophistries such as:
Attempts to solve the sorites paradox also throw issues of reference into sharp relief.
The Sorites paradox is a paradox that on the surface does not involve self-reference at all.
Consider a sorites with a base step that starts from a number too large for us to think about.
As will emerge, the forced march sorites plays an important role in several treatments of the paradox.
However, ambiguity need not be characterized by borderline cases nor by sorites-series susceptibility.
This straightforward response is open to the objection that the sorites monger could stabilize reference.
An alternative truth degree based solution to the sorites paradox has been proposed by Hájek & Novák (2003).
And we can construct a sorites series, and a sorites paradox for the application of the law:
Some see unification as much more clearly indicated by the supposed fact that the semantic and sorites paradoxes themselves are “of a kind”.
On this view, the challenge posed by the sorites paradox can be met by logical revision in the metatheory alone, and a type (2) response is advocated.
The sorites paradox has traditionally been seen as unrelated in any substantially interesting way to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes of self-reference.
Since epistemicists try to solve the sorites with little more than a resolute application of classical logic, they are methodologically committed to a partisan role for logic.
The idea of truth as a graded notion has been applied to model vague predicates and to obtain a solution to the Sorites Paradox, the Paradox of the Heap (see the entry on the Sorites Paradox).
There are many alternative theories of vagueness (see entry on vagueness), but there is a general agreement that the susceptibility to the sorites paradox (see entry on sorites paradox) is a main feature of vagueness.
The latter view has been criticized for (among other things) applying only to the forced march paradox as opposed to the sorites proper; the sorites concerns a series of values (properties like colors, heights, ages, etc.) in the abstract, independently of anything to do with speakers’ verbal dispositions or behaviors.
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The latter view has been criticized for among other things applying only to the forced march paradox as opposed to the sorites proper the sorites concerns a series of values properties like colors heights ages etc in the abstract independently of anything to do with speakers verbal dispositions or behaviors