Which features of a belief are J-factors?
As such, it is distinguished from polytheism, the belief in the existence of many gods, from atheism, the belief that there is no god, and from agnosticism, the belief that the existence or nonexistence of a god or of gods is unknown or unknowable.
For any sentence a ∈ L0 and a belief set K ∈ L0,
The “di” will stand for the actual reason(s) for the belief.
There is a widespread conflation of belief contents and belief states.
Gettier presented two cases in which a true belief is inferred from a justified false belief.
Knowledge is true belief plus something that ties the true belief to the world in the right way.
Therefore, belief bases make it possible to distinguish between different inconsistent belief states.
Instead, utterances of such belief attributions merely suggest that the subject has a first-person belief.
The above attempts to characterise degree of belief then fill in the picture of the role degree of belief plays.
The reason is that since belief revision operates within classical logic, there is only one inconsistent belief set.
Those elements of the belief set that are not in the belief base are “merely derived”, i.e., they have no independent standing.
Finally, assuming that there are norms of some sort governing belief-formation, what does that imply about the nature of belief?
Most models of belief change are deterministic in the sense that given a belief set and an input, the resulting belief set is well-determined.
The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our habits of belief-formation, belief-maintenance, and belief-relinquishment.
However, even if knowledge does require justified belief, it does not require only justified belief, so skepticism about moral knowledge does not imply skepticism about justified moral belief.
So when we say that it is a belief that has a particular narrow content, we cannot be speaking of a general type of belief, at least not if the type is determined by the broad content of the belief.
We can distinguish between two types of foundational theories of the justification of memory belief: simple foundationalism holds that every memory belief, just in virtue of being a memory belief, is prima facie justified.
The argument from belief proceeds in two steps: It is argued, first, that belief is essentially normative, and second, that there is an essential connection between belief and content such that if belief is essentially normative it follows that content is, too.
Since we can express conditional belief (and since conditional belief describes static belief revision), what we obtain is a theory of defeasible knowledge, possession of information, conditional belief, unconditional belief, and static belief revision.
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