Often beliefs and attitudes affect each other (1944, 5; 1950).
This analysis of dream beliefs has consequences for skepticism.
What else besides beliefs is there that can justify beliefs?
If all beliefs are true, the belief that “Not all beliefs are true” must be true too.
Foundationalists hold that some beliefs are justified without being justified by other beliefs.
In any particular structure, certain beliefs, beliefs about belief, …, will be present and others won’t be.
Second, how must inferentially acquired beliefs be related to basic beliefs in order for them to be justified?
Some philosophers hold that indexical beliefs are de re beliefs, which are beliefs of objects.
But there can be no beliefs about nothing; and there are false beliefs; so false belief isn’t the same thing as believing what is not.
According to Reliabilism, beliefs are warranted if they are formed by a process that generally produces true beliefs rather than false ones.
When someone is objective, his or her beliefs have the right direction of fit: the beliefs are arranged in order to fit the way the world is.
Foundationalists claim that there are basic justified beliefs—beliefs that are justified but not in virtue of their relations to other beliefs.
The famous Cartesian hypothesis is of a demon who deceives me in all of my beliefs about the external world, while also ensuring that my beliefs are completely coherent.
The first is that experiences are acquisitions of beliefs; the second is that they are dispositions to form beliefs; the third is that they are grounds of dispositions to form beliefs.
But surely, some beliefs about which beliefs are beneficial contradict other beliefs about which beliefs are beneficial; especially if some people are better than others at bringing about beneficial beliefs.
Denying that dream beliefs have the status of real beliefs only makes sense before the background of a specific account of what beliefs are and how they are distinguished from other mental states such as delusions or propositional imaginings.
Foundationalism is the view that some beliefs are epistemologically basic—i.e., their justification does not depend on evidential support from other beliefs—and all other beliefs ultimately derive their justification from basic beliefs.
Belief Revision has traditionally restricted attention to single-agent, “ontic” belief change: the beliefs in question all belong to a single agent, and the beliefs themselves concern only the “facts” of the world and not, in particular, higher-order beliefs (i.e., beliefs about beliefs).
Privilege foundationalism is generally thought to restrict basic beliefs so that beliefs about contingent, mind-independent facts cannot be basic, since beliefs about such facts are generally thought to lack the privilege that attends our introspective beliefs about our own present mental states, or our beliefs about a priori necessities.
Where such advocates credit some initial beliefs with strong initial acceptance, as Rawls (Rawls 1971) does when he refers to some beliefs as initial “fixed points,” the beliefs remain revisable; in any case, they are not taken to be points we believe independently of other moral and non-moral beliefs we hold, and so they have no special foundations (Harman 2003).
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Where such advocates credit some initial beliefs with strong initial acceptance as Rawls Rawls 1971 does when he refers to some beliefs as initial fixed points the beliefs remain revisable in any case they are not taken to be points we believe independently of other moral and non-moral beliefs we hold and so they have no special foundations Harman 2003