What about other people’s concepts?
They may not require use of concepts.
Empiricism regarding concepts and empiricism regarding knowledge do not strictly imply each other.
Concepts so understood are things we can understand.
Instead, concepts can be viewed as sets of typical features.
This implies that disability is central to both of these concepts (2005: 7).
These species concepts assume that species are lineages and thus individuals.
Those are the only concepts we can have—the only concepts we can possibly get.
Like Thin Centralism, No Priority entails that one cannot grasp thick concepts without grasping thin concepts.
On one version of this view, phenomenal concepts are just indexical concepts applied to phenomenal states via introspection (see Lycan 1996).
(And if thick terms and concepts aren’t inherently evaluative, we must instead say how they differ from other non-evaluative descriptive concepts.)
But by considering all moral concepts together and offering reductive definitions of networks of moral concepts, this difficulty can, perhaps, be overcome.
Russell's analysis of identity sentences in Principles §64 falls out of his theory of denoting concepts—concepts that, like intensions, determine an extension.
Following one reading of Aristotle, al-Fārābī believes that there are ten maximally inclusive simple primary concepts (ignoring “thing”, “concept”, “one”, and “being” which include all concepts).
It is one thing to say that thick concepts are a distinctive kind of evaluative concepts, another to say that this gives them distinctive philosophical significance not carried by thin concepts.
The aim of the proponents of these concepts is to re-interpret the knowledge of contemporary genetics by replacing sloppy thinking based on unclear concepts with more rigorous thinking in terms of precise concepts.
Some think that simpler concepts could be combined in conceptions to formulate more sophisticated concepts or to fix the reference of more sophisticated concepts that remain at roughly the grain of the lexemes of a language.
On Tsongkhapa’s model, certain concepts (i.e., concepts about emptiness) are the right kinds of concepts, which means that if one has not carefully constructed the right kinds of concepts in the right ways, one will not attain enlightenment.
As was mentioned previously, Schleiermacher’s theory of concepts also says that they are in each case defined by relations of subsumption under higher concepts, contrast with correlative concepts similarly subsumed, and subsumption of further concepts under them.
Causation, according to various contemporary philosophers, is required for the analysis of metaphysical concepts such as persistence, scientific concepts such as explanation and disposition, epistemic concepts such as perception and warrant, ethical concepts such as action and responsibility, mental concepts such as functional role and conceptual content, and linguistic concepts such as reference.
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Causation according to various contemporary philosophers is required for the analysis of metaphysical concepts such as persistence scientific concepts such as explanation and disposition epistemic concepts such as perception and warrant ethical concepts such as action and responsibility mental concepts such as functional role and conceptual content and linguistic concepts such as reference