Thus decision-theoretic epistemology was born.
But this is only a decision-theoretic statement.
When we state the decision-theoretic norms in question, we state them in full generality.
Very roughly speaking, epistemic probabilities can be doxastic, decision-theoretic, or logical.
They consist of a mathematically-precise account of epistemic disutility and a decision-theoretic norm.
These decision-theoretic considerations lead naturally to a brief consideration of the axiological problem of truthlikeness.
That said, one should be cautious about generalizations sometimes made about the limited role of decision theoretic tools in the study of bounded rationality.
This entry provides an overview of the issues that arise when one takes this broadly decision-theoretic view on rational decision making in games.
In an epistemic analysis of a game, the specific recommendations or predictions for the players’ choices are derived from decision-theoretic choice rules.
The epistemic approach to game theory focuses on the choices of individual decision makers in specific informational contexts, assessed on the basis of decision-theoretic choice rules.
In this section, we move from the account of epistemic disutility on which the argument is based to the decision-theoretic principle to which we appeal in order to derive Probabilism from this account.
What decision they will make—the descriptive question—or what decision they should make—the normative question, depends on the decision-theoretic choice rule that the player use, or should use, in a given context.
That is, these authors agree with Pascal that wagering for God really is rationally mandated by Pascal’s decision matrix in tandem with positive probability for God’s existence, and the decision theoretic account of rational action.
Critics of this decision-theoretic approach, such as Laudan (2006), argue that it’s difficult or impossible to bridge the gap between the evidence admissible in court, and the real probability of the defendant’s guilt.
One salient feature of Levi's models is that they are grounded on decision-theoretic techniques and this applies not only to contraction but also to expansion, which in Levi's hands is treated as a form of induction (see Levi 1996).
The aim is to characterise the attitudes of agents who are practically rational, and various (static and sequential) arguments are typically made to show that certain practical catastrophes befall agents who do not satisfy standard decision-theoretic constraints.
By his own decision theoretic lights, you would not act stupidly “by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you”—in fact, you should not stake more than an infinitesimal amount in that case (an amount that is bigger than 0, but smaller than every positive real number).
Since the relevant utilities depend on the individual circumstances, such as the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the punishment, the decision-theoretic account of the standard of proof would seem, on both the simple and the modified version, to lead to the conclusion that the probabilistic threshold should vary from case to case (Lillquist 2002; Bartels 1981; Laudan and Saunders 2009).
For another thing, Douven (1999) argues that the question of whether a probabilistic rule is coherent is not one that can be settled independently of considering which other epistemic and decision-theoretic rules are deployed along with it; coherence should be understood as a property of packages of both epistemic and decision-theoretic rules, not of epistemic rules (such as probabilistic rules for belief change) in isolation.
Christopher Meacham (2018) objects to this response in two ways: first, he argues that the different decision-theoretic norms that are used in the justifications of the various credal norms listed above might be incompatible with one another; and, second, he worries that some of the decision-theoretic norms that are used in those justifications are not themselves purely alethic and therefore fail to provide purely veritistic justifications of the norms in question.
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Christopher Meacham 2018 objects to this response in two ways first he argues that the different decision-theoretic norms that are used in the justifications of the various credal norms listed above might be incompatible with one another and second he worries that some of the decision-theoretic norms that are used in those justifications are not themselves purely alethic and therefore fail to provide purely veritistic justifications of the norms in question