(See the entry on descriptions.)
Every one of these descriptions comes from a Republican member of Congress or of Trump’s own administration.
More specific descriptions can be used where relevant when mentioning individuals associated with the movement, but such descriptions should be evidence-based.
Before a film can be made the screenwriter must first create a screenplay which serves as a detailed scene by scene plan for the film and includes visual descriptions of characters and actions, spoken dialogue and clear and consistent descriptions of locations.
Why suppose that definite descriptions fail to refer?
Such definite descriptions are therefore “de facto” rigid designators.
Many people will associate many different descriptions with the name ‘Santa Claus’.
We’ve already put the uniqueness and existence claims of descriptions under pressure.
These descriptions are content-involving, to use Christopher Peacocke’s (1994) terminology.
But if we treat anaphors as standing proxy for descriptions, the back door is blocked as well.
Still, there are also reasons to question Russell’s claim that definite descriptions fail to refer.
The result is essentially Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, but with the description operator taken as primitive rather than contextually defined.
In addition to going proxy for Russellian singular descriptions in the way we have seen, Neale claims that anaphoric pronouns sometimes go proxy for numberless descriptions.
For linguists it is now standard to think of indefinite descriptions following the copula as always being predicational, and it is a widespread belief that definite descriptions following the copula are often predicational.
Most of the action in the philosophy of language has been with definite descriptions, but indefinite descriptions have also generated a fair bit of attention—some of it mirroring the debates about definite descriptions.
One of the most frequent uses of situation-based frameworks is in the analysis of “donkey” pronouns, that is, anaphoric pronouns that are interpreted as definite descriptions (see descriptive theories of anaphora under the entry descriptions and the entry anaphora).
So far we have discussed singular definite and indefinite descriptions (and the possibility that names are descriptions) but as it turns out these types of descriptions are probably not the most commonly occurring descriptions in English.
As noted in the beginning of this article, the Russellian account of descriptions not only offers a quantificational as opposed to a referential account of descriptions, but it packs three different claims into the analysis of descriptions: an existence claim, a uniqueness claim, and a maximality claim.
An identity version of (Moderate or Strong) PIT will be reductive if it holds or entails that phenomenal intentional states are identical to phenomenal states and that phenomenal descriptions are more fundamental than intentional descriptions (just as “H2O” descriptions are more fundamental than “water” descriptions).
The world can be described egocentrically in terms of “impressions” and “sense data,” but, Reichenbach argues, ordinary descriptions of things are not equivalent to egocentric descriptions in terms of impressions, because, however elaborate, egocentric formulations do not entail object claims, they only confer a probability on object descriptions, (and, of course, in parallel, given Reichenbach's anti-foundationalism, egocentric descriptions are only probable).
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The world can be described egocentrically in terms of impressions and sense data but Reichenbach argues ordinary descriptions of things are not equivalent to egocentric descriptions in terms of impressions because however elaborate egocentric formulations do not entail object claims they only confer a probability on object descriptions and of course in parallel given Reichenbach's anti-foundationalism egocentric descriptions are only probable