Perception is reduced to dispositions and causes.
The topic of dispositions is interesting in its own right.
Another springs from the possibility of multiple realization of dispositions.
Taken together, these arguments will show the impossibility of bare dispositions.
That is true of type-specifying dispositions, but not of detail-specifying dispositions.
We have thus far seen that there is an ongoing debate regarding the thesis that all dispositions have distinct causal bases.
There is a simple, conservative theory of desire according to which having a desire is a matter of having dispositions to act.
Johnston’s reply to this objection is that the dispositions do not have to be thought of as bare dispositions.
For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods.
To avoid confusion, however, we will stick to the term ‘disposition’ (for a subtle difference between dispositions and powers, see Bird 2016).
But the argument at hand, if successful, would demonstrate that fundamental properties are bare dispositions, entailing that bare dispositions do actually exist.
Qualitative mental events (such as sensations, perceptual experiences, and so on), for Place, undergird dispositions to behave rather than count as dispositions.
Some philosophers hold that colors are dispositions to cause certain kinds of sensory experiences in us, rather than dispositions to reflect light in certain ways.
If one has already accepted that there might be bare dispositions then, McKitrick suggests, one should not be uncomfortable with the idea that there could be ‘barely similar’ possible worlds.
From their respective analysis of canonical dispositions, then, they can readily derive an analysis of conventional dispositions like fragility that does away with ceteris paribus clauses.
In what follows, we will instead focus on single-track conventional dispositions that correspond to a unique pair of stimulus condition and manifestation, or alternatively we will simply assume that all conventional dispositions are single-track.
One view is that non-phenomenal intentional states are simply dispositions to have phenomenal intentional states and that these dispositions get their contents from the phenomenal intentional states that they are dispositions to bring about (Searle 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992).
The central problem with both of these arguments is that, while they are true of overt behavior, they are not true of the behavioral dispositions or strategies (complex behavioral dispositions) which are the actual targets of explanation in behavioral ecology—or at least, no more true than of psychological mechanisms.
Critical thinking dispositions can usefully be divided into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started) (Facione 1990a: 25).
Thus, Stevenson associates the meaning of a word or sentence with neither perlocutionary intentions nor with illocutionary force, but rather with the conjunction or union of its passive and active dispositions—its passive dispositions to be used to express a speaker's mental states and its active dispositions to evoke mental states of a speaker's audience.
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Thus Stevenson associates the meaning of a word or sentence with neither perlocutionary intentions nor with illocutionary force but rather with the conjunction or union of its passive and active dispositions—its passive dispositions to be used to express a speaker's mental states and its active dispositions to evoke mental states of a speaker's audience