We do not believe in abstract entities.
Values, for Hartmann, are ideal entities.
We present Lonlies, a system for estimating property values of long tail entities by leveraging their relationships to head topics and entities.
The bill defines eligible providers as "public entities, Medicare or Medicaid enrolled suppliers and providers, and such for-profit entities and not-for-profit entities … that provide diagnoses, testing, or care for individuals with possible or actual cases of COVID–19."
One way to read this is that only the entities posited by the natural sciences exist.
Naturalism, then, gives us a reason for believing in the entities in our best scientific theories and no other entities.
Are there abstract entities, such as sets or numbers, in addition to concrete entities, such as people and puddles and protons?
This crude description of the fictionalist position immediately opens up the question what sort of entities fictional entities are.
Instead of searching for an exhaustive determination base for all social entities, they focus on a particular subset of social entities.
Others argue that this asks too much: they agree that we can analyze constituents of social entities, but deny that social entities decompose into non-social parts.
However, less popular entities are not frequently mentioned on the web and are generally interesting to fewer users; these entities reside on the long tail of information.
What follows is a discussion of one familiar and quite fundamental topic in this area: fictional entities (both the issue of what such entities might be like and whether there really are such entities).
Basic neutral entities form the bottom level of the hierarchy; the non-basic, non-neutral entities at the higher levels reduce to, or are in some sense derivative from, those lower level neutral entities.
The fixed entities are not the “archetypes” of the existent entities but are rather identical (‘ayn) with them; nor are they “essences”, if by this is meant anything other than the entities’ specific whatness.
Most extant versions of neutral monism seem to acknowledge that, in addition to the basic neutral entities, there exist derivative, non-basic, and non-neutral entities—mental and physical entities, for example.
And neutral monism is compatible with the existence of non-neutral entities—mental and material entities, for example—assuming that these non-neutral entities are, in some sense, derivative of the ultimate neutral entities.
And even within the level of the basic neutral entities we can distinguish those versions of neutral monism that hold that all basic entities belong to a single category, from those that distinguish two or more categories of neutral entities.
On the semantic side, we identify entities in free text, label them with types (such as person, location, or organization), cluster mentions of those entities within and across documents (coreference resolution), and resolve the entities to the Knowledge Graph.
Reductionism, in philosophy, a view that asserts that entities of a given kind are identical to, or are collections or combinations of, entities of another (often simpler or more basic) kind or that expressions denoting such entities are definable in terms of expressions denoting other entities.
Further, even if they are ontological dualists, source physicalists need not claim that mental entities never cause physical entities or other mental entities, but they must claim that there would be no mental entities were it not for the prior existence (and causal powers) of one or more physical entities.
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Further even if they are ontological dualists source physicalists need not claim that mental entities never cause physical entities or other mental entities but they must claim that there would be no mental entities were it not for the prior existence and causal powers of one or more physical entities