On its use as a fictional sentence it is allegedly equivalent to:
The unlikely script, albeit technically possible, is a fictional dream.
The categories briefly discussed above are among the most common fictional forms.
If this is right, any search for the real ontological status of fictional objects appears to be misguided.
Though not meant to be a fictional object, Vulcan may be given the same treatment as explicitly fictional objects.
Mathematical theories describe fictional entities, in the same way that literary fiction describes fictional characters.
(In Castañeda’s variant of neo-Meinongianism, fictional objects are systems of set-correlates, built up, or put together, by a fiction maker (cf.
Fictional objects include fictional characters but not all fictional objects are fictional characters.
Neo-Meinongianism thus sees a fictional object as something that pre-dates the story-telling activities that intuitively bring fictional objects into being.
If senses of this type can model the notion of a fictional entity, then Frege can be construed as a kind of fictional realist (Künne 1990); otherwise, he can’t.
Not surprisingly, then, one fundamental philosophical question we can ask about fictional entities is a question about their nature: what kind of thing is a fictional entity?
(Salmon (1998) and Thomasson (1999) also take fictional objects to be abstract, but their views are a bit different; they maintain that abstract fictional objects are created by humans.)
Anna Karenina therefore turns out to be internally non-fictional (since it is true in the novel that she is a woman, not a fictional character), and externally fictional.
Obviously the important division at the ontological level lies between those who believe that there are fictional entities—fictional realists—and those who believe that there no such entities—fictional antirealists.
But there is a similar argument that does not rely on a parallelism between fictional works and fictional characters, but on the fact that the identity conditions of the fictional works refer to fictional characters.
Robert Howell criticizes Parsons’ theory, among others, and recommends an approach which construes fictional objects as non-actual objects in fictional worlds, where fictional worlds include not just possible but impossible worlds (Howell 1979).
Her argument claims that we cannot reject fictional objects if we admit fictional works: given that fictional objects and fictional works belong to the same genus of entities (the genus of created, artifactual objects) it would be false parsimony to accept the one and reject the other.
They argue that even though fictional sentences on their non-conniving use can be paraphrased as internal metafictional sentences on their de dicto reading and thus do not commit us to fictional characters, external metafictional sentences cannot be paraphrased in this way, and their truth really does commit us to fictional characters (see, for example, Schiffer 1996 and Thomasson 2003b).
Some realist positions take fictional objects to be types (Wolterstorff 1980), thereby sharing with non-orthodox Meinongianism a form of Platonism about fictional objects; others take them to be work-bound roles (Currie 1990), thereby holding a form of abstractionism that leads to a conception of fictional objects as dependent entities, like the conception explicitly defended by creationists (see below).
In other words, one could admit that (H) is a claim about fictional characters and then one could claim that since there are no such things as fictional characters, (H) is simply not true, although of course it might be true-in-the-story-of-fictional-characters, where this just means that it would have been true if there had been a realm of fictional characters of the sort that platonists believe in.
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In other words one could admit that H is a claim about fictional characters and then one could claim that since there are no such things as fictional characters H is simply not true although of course it might be true-in-the-story-of-fictional-characters where this just means that it would have been true if there had been a realm of fictional characters of the sort that platonists believe in