The non-truth-functionalist (call her Arrow) gets this wrong.
Among contemporary scholars a functionalist and political interpretation has been offered.
These include the Functionalist-style Sonneveld House plus Piet Blom's Pencil Tower and Cube Houses.
This does not suffice to create trouble for the functionalist yet.
All of the above are examples of a functionalist explanation of norms.
Holistic theories of desire come in two main forms: functionalist and interpretationist.
Shoemaker’s functionalist theory of mind has received considerable attention in the philosophy of mind.
For the functionalist, to believe just is to be in a state that plays (something like) this sort of causal role.
Third, the functionalist account clearly assumes that the demands of morality conflict with individual rationality.
Some functionalist theories also make ontological claims, arguing that the nature of social entities involves their functions.
Functionalist theories in particular rely heavily on the notion of realization to explicate the relation between consciousness and the physical.
There is one final strategy for defending a functionalist account of qualitative states against all of these objections, namely, eliminativism (Dennett 1988; Rey 1997, Frankish, 2016).
There is one other defense of the utility of inversion scenarios in anti-functionalist arguments, namely that some of them are biologically possible—and hence not as far fetched as scenarios containing zombies or thinking rocks.
Another, arguably more prominent, way to make sense of the nature is by figuring out, in a broadly functionalist framework, how it fits in with more well-understood mental entities from folk psychology and scientific psychology (see the entry on functionalism).
But Davidson’s saving move appears not to be available for the functionalist, for in the case of functional states and properties, no such independent descriptions are available, as the nature of a functional property is exhausted by its place in the causal network.
In a series of influential papers, David Lewis (1966, 1970, 1972, 1994) defended a particular approach to the semantics of theoretical terms, applied that approach to the everyday psychological vocabulary (eg “belief” and “desire”), and thereby obtain a functionalist theory of mental states.
On the other hand, for those who reject the functional analysis and regard many worlds as ontologically inadequate (see Maudlin 2010), or who, like Vaidman (see the SEP entry on the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics), accepts many worlds on non-functionalist grounds, the claim should seem empty.
There has been significant skepticism, however, about whether any functionalist theory — analytic or scientific — can capture what seems to be the distinctive qualitative character of experiential states such as color perceptions, pains, and other bodily sensations; these questions will be addressed in section 5.5 below.
In general, the sophistication of functionalist theories has increased since their introduction, but so has the sophistication of the objections to functionalism, especially to functionalist accounts of mental causation (section 5.2), introspective knowledge (Section 5.3), and the qualitative character of experiential states (Section 5.5).
Nonetheless, although many functionalists argue that the considerations discussed above show that there is no in principle bar to a functionalist theory that has empirical force, these worries about the normativity of intentional ascription continue to fuel skepticism about functionalism (and, for that matter, any scientific theory of the mind that uses intentional notions).
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Nonetheless although many functionalists argue that the considerations discussed above show that there is no in principle bar to a functionalist theory that has empirical force these worries about the normativity of intentional ascription continue to fuel skepticism about functionalism and for that matter any scientific theory of the mind that uses intentional notions