First, how do they find unity in the guises of intention?
In this paper we address the interplay among intention, time, and belief in dynamic environments.
Wounds, whether caused by accidental injury or a surgical scalpel, heal in three ways: (1) primary intention (wound edges are brought together, as in a clean surgical wound), (2) secondary intention (the wound is left open and heals by epithelization), or (3) third intention, or delayed closure (the wound is identified as potentially infected, is left open until contamination is minimized, and is then closed).
Further problems attend the concurrent intention that is required.
An intention with which one is doing A is an intentional-action-in-progress that explains one’s doing it.
In particular, how does intentional action relate to prospective intention and intention-with-which?
Even if knowledge about our plan is mutual and open between us, my intention and your intention may still be purely individual.
The question is whether such accounts reveal the unity of intentional action, intention for the future, and intention-with-which.
In prospective intention, I intend not only to do A, but to do A intentionally, and the same point holds for the object of intention in action.
One source of concern about intention as efficient cause is that intention need not precede intentional action, while causes must precede their effects.
A deeper problem for the teleological approach is how to complete this construction with an account of prospective intention in terms of intention-with-which.
Nor does she regard intention for the future as needing further explanation once intentional action and intention-with-which have been understood (Anscombe 1963, pp. 90–4).
Expressing an intention or volition is not the same as (self-)ascribing an intention or volition, nor are such expressions descriptions of intentions or predictions of action.
The intention to produce a belief or other attitude by means (at least in part) of recognition of this very intention, has come to be called a reflexive communicative intention.
Pressures of this kind push us towards the second approach, now orthodox in action theory, which aims to explain both intentional action and intention-with-which in terms of intention as a mental state.
Davidson 1978, Harman 1976, Bratman 1986), some work on intention influenced by Anscombe and Wittgenstein (such as Wilson 1989 and Thompson 2008) understands intention fundamentally in terms of intentional action (see the entry on intention for discussion).
It is not that the mere presence of a mental state—intending of … that it …—constitutes acting with an intention, or acting intentionally, but that intention-with-which is a basic form of teleology, distinct from causation, out of which we can construct the unity of intention.
Their point is that if an intention I has as sub-intentions both the intention J and the intention that the hearer recognize I, this will yield an infinitely long sequence: the intention that: J and the hearer recognize the intention that: J and the hearer recognize the intention that: J and …).
Some of the discussion of the current literature on shared activity can be understood as a debate about the nature of this participatory intention and how instances of it in different individuals must be related to one another so that the individuals could be said to act together, and share an intention (presumably the intention expressed with the aforementioned we-locution).
Against the intention to deceive the addressee condition of L1 it has been objected that, even if an intention to deceive the addressee is required for lying, it is not necessary that it be an intention to deceive the addressee about the content of the untruthful statement; it may be an intention to deceive the addressee about the beliefs of the speaker abut the statement—specifically, the belief that the untruthful statement is true (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 152; Williams 2002, 74; Reboul 1994, 294; Mahon 2008, 220; Tollefsen 2014, 24).
- an anticipated outcome that is intended or that guides your planned actions
- (usually plural) the goal with respect to a marriage proposal
Example: his intentions are entirely honorable
- an act of intending; a volition that you intend to carry out
Example: my intention changed once I saw her
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Against the intention to deceive the addressee condition of L1 it has been objected that even if an intention to deceive the addressee is required for lying it is not necessary that it be an intention to deceive the addressee about the content of the untruthful statement it may be an intention to deceive the addressee about the beliefs of the speaker abut the statement—specifically the belief that the untruthful statement is true Chisholm and Feehan 1977 152 Williams 2002 74 Reboul 1994 294 Mahon 2008 220 Tollefsen 2014 24