That is not intentional though.
What is the basis of privileging one intentional action over others?
Further, on her view intentional action is prior to intention to act.
So, it seems that wide intentional states are not phenomenal intentional states.
A compound sentence counts as intentional if and only if one of its components is intentional.
Since intentional objects need not exist, according to intentional-object theorists, there are things that do not exist.
What distinguishes intentional from non-intentional experiences is the former's having intentional content.
We will call intentional states that are not phenomenal intentional states non-phenomenal intentional state.
Eliminativism consists in denying the existence of the putative intentional state (or denying that it is an intentional state).
On such nonreductive views, phenomenal descriptions of intentional states are not more fundamental then intentional descriptions.
One is the assumption that the mystery of the intentional relation should be elucidated against the background of non-intentional relations.
Our definition of phenomenal intentional states is neutral between two types of views regarding how phenomenal states constitute intentional states.
Metacognitive and introspective judgments result from intentional action, so why not look at intentional action, broadly construed, for evidence of consciousness?
Intentional-object theorists hold that the above inferences involving both non-intentional and intentional relations constitute data that call for a consistent explanation.
For example this sort of disjunctivist may hold that the intentional content of a veridical perception is constitutively dependent on mind-independent objects, while the intentional content of a hallucination is not.
Another view is that non-phenomenal intentional states get their intentionality from functional relations they bear to phenomenal intentional states (Loar 2003a, Horgan & Tienson 2002, Graham, Horgan, & Tienson 2007).
Now we come to the cases in which, allegedly, either two experiences differ in their sensory qualities without differing in intentional content or they differ entirely in their intentional content but share sensory qualities.
One view is that non-phenomenal intentional states are simply dispositions to have phenomenal intentional states and that these dispositions get their contents from the phenomenal intentional states that they are dispositions to bring about (Searle 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992).
It could be that many intentional states are phenomenal intentional states but some intentional states are neither phenomenal intentional states nor grounded in phenomenal intentionality (Bailey and Richards (2014) point out related limitations of the argument).
To see how the theory of intentional objects flows from Brentano’s characterization of intentionality, recall (from section 2) that it follows from the nature of intentionality (as described by Brentano’s first thesis) that nothing could exhibit intentionality unless there were objects – intentional objects – that satisfied the property Brentano called “intentional inexistence.”
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To see how the theory of intentional objects flows from Brentanos characterization of intentionality recall from section 2 that it follows from the nature of intentionality as described by Brentanos first thesis that nothing could exhibit intentionality unless there were objects – intentional objects – that satisfied the property Brentano called intentional inexistence