The form of terminating judgements is:
Impartiality properly understood can support those confronted with difficult editorial judgements which can be particularly complex when dealing with causes which drive towards moral judgements.
Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are greater Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive mony to give False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater summe; because not onely he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all Judgements are rendered uselesse, and occasion ministred to force, and private revenges.
And we could be guided by such judgements.
In other words, simple judgements do not have a propositional content.
Hare called inverted commas moral judgements (1952, 124–126, 163–165).
None of these conditional judgements are decisively verifiable or falsifiable by experience.
However, none of the named philosophers goes as far as Brentano and takes all judgements to be existential.
Brentano here exploits the principle that judgements of the E-form contradict judgements of the I-form.
Objective judgements don't strictly imply terminating judgements of the form (S & A) → E (Lewis 1946, 219).
It does not say that existential propositions express categorical judgements, but conversely that categorical propositions express existential judgements.
Meinong did not consider this possibility; he just reduced inferences to particular (specially “motivated”) judgements about assumptions or about judgements (1910, §§27–32).
Furthermore, higher-order judgements about the correctness and incorrectness of judgements exhibit the same complexity and come to play a prominent role in Brentano’s theory.
The other was the autonomy-of-ethics thesis that moral judgements are sui generis, neither reducible to nor derivable from non-moral, that is, scientific or metaphysical judgements.
We usually do not make simple judgements, but what Brentano now calls “double judgements”, and in order to express such judgements we make use of the categorical form.
While holding on to his view that existential propositions express categorical judgements, and that categorical propositions can express existential judgements, Brentano later dropped the reduction thesis.
Whether it was Hillebrand or Brentano who made the point, it is a very good question: Why should one bother to reduce categorical to existential judgements, if most of our judgements are expressed in categorical form?
Brentano’s discussion of existential judgements aims to show that such judgements cannot be conceived as predications of properties (see section 1.1) and that such judgements are either acknowledgements or rejections of objects.
The first part tries to establish the fundamental difference between judgements (Urteile) and presentations (Vorstellungen); the second part pertains to the relation between judgement and truth; the third part deals with existential judgements and their intentional objects; and the fourth part proposes a reduction of categorical and hypothetical judgements to the existential form.
Among the irrealists, we can distinguish explicitly non-cognitivist views like emotivism and prescriptivism which deny that moral judgements express beliefs (Hare 1952, Blackburn 1993, Gibbard 2003) from cognitivist views that accept that moral judgements do express beliefs but deny a substantial reality to the putative facts to which they answer; and among the latter cognitivist views we can distinguish error-theoretic fictionalist options which view moral judgements as simply false (Mackie 1977, Kalderon 2005) from projectivist options which hold that moral discourse is sufficiently disciplined for its judgements to qualify for a species of truth even though they do not report on independently existing causally significant facts (Wright 1992, Price 2011).
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Among the irrealists we can distinguish explicitly non-cognitivist views like emotivism and prescriptivism which deny that moral judgements express beliefs Hare 1952 Blackburn 1993 Gibbard 2003 from cognitivist views that accept that moral judgements do express beliefs but deny a substantial reality to the putative facts to which they answer and among the latter cognitivist views we can distinguish error-theoretic fictionalist options which view moral judgements as simply false Mackie 1977 Kalderon 2005 from projectivist options which hold that moral discourse is sufficiently disciplined for its judgements to qualify for a species of truth even though they do not report on independently existing causally significant facts Wright 1992 Price 2011