Thus, value judgments or appraisals result in new valuings.
It is this that distinguishes judgments of taste from empirical judgments.
Synthetic a priori judgments, by contrast, are non-empirical, non-contingent judgments.
Then there are judgments of actions as “right” or “wrong” (sometimes called “deontic” judgments).
And secondly, it is part of the meaning of substantive aesthetic judgments that they imply verdictive aesthetic judgments.
This combination of features seems to suggest that judgments of beauty should be assimilated to judgments of the agreeable.
Schlick (1910) agrees: ‘There is no truth of judgments such that this truth is independent of the judgments’ existence in mental acts.
The fundamental difference in uses of judgments is between (a) theoretical judgments and (b) non-theoretical judgments.
On one hand, people can make straightforwardly moral judgments (e.g., judgments about moral wrongness, about obligation, about blameworthiness).
Now one way in which moral judgments could motivate, and, indeed, motivate on their own, would be if moral judgments were not representational after all.
Notice that Twardowski is not saying that judgments can be integrated or completed: the judgments we formulate in our head, and which are true or false, are complete and fully unambiguous.
Thus, it might be thought that (a) people’s moral judgments depend on prior non-moral judgments, but (b) people’s non-moral judgments do not depend on prior moral judgments.
According to Kant's official view there are three kinds of aesthetic judgment: judgments of the agreeable, judgments of beauty (or, equivalently, judgments of taste), and judgments of the sublime.
Let us call judgments of taste, or judgments of beauty and ugliness, “verdictive aesthetic judgments”, and let us call the other aesthetic judgments (of daintiness, dumpiness, elegance, delicacy, etc.)
The issue of value judgments at earlier stages of inquiry is not addressed by this proposal; however, disentangling evidential judgments and judgments involving contextual values at the stage of theory assessment may be a good thing in itself.
But the fact that their universal validity is not based on concepts distinguishes judgments of beauty from non-evaluative cognitive judgments and judgments of the good, both of which make a claim to universal validity that is based on concepts.
On this approach, judgments of daintiness, dumpiness, delicacy and elegance stand in a special and intimate relation to judgments of beauty and ugliness (or aesthetic merit and demerit), and it is only in virtue of this intimate relation that we can think of all these judgments as belonging to the same category.
Thus most non-cognitivists today extend the treatment to normative or evaluative judgments generally, and the discussion below will often speak of normative or evaluative judgments and terms – a category which includes as paradigms moral judgments, judgments of rationality, and judgments of value.
But reflective judgment is also described as responsible for two specific kinds of judgments: aesthetic judgments (judgments about the beautiful and the sublime) and teleological judgments (judgments which ascribe ends or purposes to natural things, or which characterize them in purposive or functional terms).
We can understand other aesthetic kinds of things in terms of aesthetic judgments: aesthetic properties are those that are ascribed in aesthetic judgments; aesthetic experiences are those that ground aesthetic judgments; aesthetic concepts are those that are deployed in aesthetic judgments; and aesthetic words are those that have the function of being used in the linguistic expression of aesthetic judgments.
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We can understand other aesthetic kinds of things in terms of aesthetic judgments aesthetic properties are those that are ascribed in aesthetic judgments aesthetic experiences are those that ground aesthetic judgments aesthetic concepts are those that are deployed in aesthetic judgments and aesthetic words are those that have the function of being used in the linguistic expression of aesthetic judgments