Objection: The justification given doesn’t justify Strong Convexity.
Subsequently justification logics were introduced into formal epistemology.
More interesting is strong justification externalism, or strong AJE, namely:
This section has raised some problems for this third conception of justification.
But are all cases of perceptual justification ones in which attention is involved?
Presumably, what makes a claim of justification true is the basis of that justification.
It is your having justification for (1) and (2) that gives you justification for believing (H).
A priori justification is a type of epistemic justification that is, in some sense, independent of experience.
The second kind of additional justification can be characterised as quantitatively strengthening justification.
For your justification for P5 transmitted to Q5 is intuitively quantitatively stronger than your initial justification for Q5.
For in none of these cases s has justification for believing p, s knows that p entails q, and s fails to have justification for believing q.
In sum, Kuhn turned the traditional ideas of scientific justification, based on the discovery-justification-context distinction, on their head.
If the justification you have for p transmits to its unchecked prediction q through the entailment, you acquire justification for believing q too.
This additional justification is transmitted irrespective of the fact that you already have justification for Q4, acquired by spotting the train station sign ‘Newcastle upon Tyne’.
Whether S’s belief has doxastic justification depends on S’s actual grounds for believing p: if, on these grounds, p would count as rational, then p possesses doxastic justification.
An interesting question is whether it is true that as q receives via transmission from p an additional quantitatively strengthening justification, q also receives an independent justification.
Goldman’s reliabilism about justification (1979), for example, has among its starting points a critique of “ahistorical”, apsychological accounts of justification—i.e., accounts which state conditions on a belief’s being justified
Similarly, some public justification theorists, such as Gauthier, have confined public justification to those who contribute to the cooperative surplus, though others have thought that the ideal of public justification applies to all citizens, regardless of their contributions.
This claim might appear intuitively plausible: perhaps it is reasonable to expect that, if the justification from e for p depends on independent justification for another proposition q, the strength of the justification available for q sets an upper bound to the strength of the justification possibly supplied by e for p.
A type of justification is defeasible if and only if that justification could be overridden by further evidence that goes against the truth of the proposition or undercut by considerations that call into question whether there really is justification (say, poor lighting conditions that call into question whether vision provides evidence in those circumstances).
- something (such as a fact or circumstance) that shows an action to be reasonable or necessary
Example: he considered misrule a justification for revolution
- a statement in explanation of some action or belief
- the act of defending or explaining or making excuses for by reasoning
Example: the justification of barbarous means by holy ends
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A type of justification is defeasible if and only if that justification could be overridden by further evidence that goes against the truth of the proposition or undercut by considerations that call into question whether there really is justification say poor lighting conditions that call into question whether vision provides evidence in those circumstances