Nor is it, as much knowledge is, a knowledge of essences.
One such view is called knowledge reliabilism; the other, the “knowledge first” view.
He recognizes two kinds of knowledge of things: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.
He defines armchair knowledge as knowledge that is either strictly a priori knowledge or not strictly a priori or a posteriori.
Intellectualism requires knowledge-that to identified with declarative knowledge, and knowledge-how with procedural knowledge.
If the qualifier “contrary” is supposed to rule out knowledge, then the opponent won’t be able to define knowledge in knowledge-independent terms.
Roughly, procedural knowledge is knowledge that is manifested in the use of a skill, whereas declarative knowledge is explicit knowledge of a fact.
By “propositional knowledge”, we mean knowledge of a proposition—for example, if Susan knows that Alyssa is a musician, she has knowledge of the proposition that Alyssa is a musician.
The third kind of knowledge that God possesses, according to Molina, is called middle knowledge (because it is “in between” God’s natural knowledge and free knowledge).
Intuition and deduction can provide us with knowledge of necessary truths such as those found in mathematics and logic, but such knowledge is not substantive knowledge of the external world.
Whereas knowledge by presence extends the nature of divine knowledge to the human and resolves the problem of God’s knowledge of particulars by insisting upon the unitive nature of that knowledge.
According to foundationalism regarding knowledge, we have some foundational knowledge, and any nonfoundational or inferential knowledge that we have depends, ultimately, on this foundational knowledge.
The general strategy is to show that sensory knowledge rests on inductive knowledge, that inductive knowledge rests on self-evident knowledge, and that introspective knowledge can be defended as analogous to self-evident knowledge.
The distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that overlaps three other distinctions: the ancient distinction between technê and episteme, the distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge, and the distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge.
If God’s knowledge of actual future actions would constitute a fatalistic threat, his middle knowledge could not be less threatening, since, given middle knowledge, he would have knowledge of actual actions on the basis of his knowledge of the circumstances.
The later Mohist texts do precisely this, presenting a fourfold categorization of knowledge that includes knowledge of names, knowledge of things, knowledge of relations between names and things, and knowledge of how to act (see the separate entry for “Mohist Canons”).
Sensitive knowledge of the corresponding objects, however, could never have this degree of certainty, and because our knowledge derives from our knowledge of objects it would seem that scientific knowledge of space is of a different kind from our knowledge of geometry.
By reducing in this manner knowledge—how to a kind of knowledge—that, intellectualists such as Stanley have accepted that knowledge-how should have properties characteristic of propositional knowledge, (see, for example, Stanley 2011: 215), of which knowledge-how is a kind.
However, 145e–147c cannot be read as a critique of the Republic’s procedure of distinguishing knowledge from belief by their objects. 145e–147c is not against defining knowledge by examples of objects of knowledge; it is against defining knowledge by examples of kinds of knowledge.
Brogaard (2009) rejects both reductionist views (which, like Hintikka’s, reduce knowledge-wh to knowledge-that) and anti-reductionist views (which, like Schaffer’s, analyze knowledge-wh as question-relative knowledge-that), arguing instead that wh-complements are predicates and knowledge-wh is a special kind of de re knowledge.
- the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning
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Brogaard 2009 rejects both reductionist views which like Hintikkas reduce knowledge-wh to knowledge-that and anti-reductionist views which like Schaffers analyze knowledge-wh as question-relative knowledge-that arguing instead that wh-complements are predicates and knowledge-wh is a special kind of de re knowledge