And how are models and laws related?
While it remains unclear whether the basic laws in fact hold superiority over other laws, Israel’s High Court of Justice has historically ruled against laws that have contradicted the basic laws.
In line with the bulk of the relevant literature, we focus on exclusive cp-laws.
Bird’s (2007) version of dispositionalism, by contrast, does not turn cp-laws into strict laws.
These are ‘heteropathic effects,’ and the causal laws which subsume them are ‘heteropathic laws.’
The lawhood of universal laws and cp-laws is due to the same property of these statements: their stability.
Cartwright’s discussion of cp-laws focused on the question why cp-laws are of interest in non-ideal situations.
Many laws we take to be strict universal laws are in fact cp-laws that hold in special circumstances only.
On Mill’s account, higher-level heteropathic laws will supplement but not supplant lower-level laws (whether homopathic or heteropathic).
Kim would reply that Davidson is only interested in rejecting strict descriptive (i.e., explanatory, predictive) laws, not strict normative laws (see below).
In this way, the evolution-theoretic foundation of normic laws does not only explain why normic laws are the typical form of the laws of life sciences.
Are these generalizations to be classified as laws—laws that pertain only to special conditions, i.e., ceteris paribus laws—or are they something entirely different.
In philosophy of science and metaphysics, laws of nature take center stage: Many explications of philosophical key concepts in philosophy of science essentially rely on laws of nature.
Thus logical laws are primarily descriptive laws even though, like other descriptive laws, they too can be reformulated or apprehended as prescriptive laws.
Public acts of civil disobedience against unjust laws might actually improve the state, insofar as they hasten the abolition of those laws, and those laws are detrimental to the state.
Trans-ordinal laws are what we now call ‘emergent laws,’ fundamental, irreducible laws that describe a synchronic, noncausal covariation of an emergent property and its lower-level emergent base.
If the laws of nature can include either sort of association, a natural question to ask seems to be: why can't there be non-probabilistic laws strong enough to ensure determinism, and on top of them, probabilistic laws as well?
Positive law should also be contrasted with “laws by a close analogy” (which includes positive morality, laws of honor, international law, customary law, and constitutional law) and “laws by remote analogy” (e.g., the laws of physics).
According to this view, ceteris paribus or non-universal laws differ from universal laws in degree, not in kind: universal laws hold under all counterfactual suppositions while ceteris paribus or non-universal laws merely hold for a limited range of suppositions.
As the philosophy of nature brings idealism forth out of realism, in that it spiritualizes the laws of nature into laws of intelligence, or adds the formal to the material, so does transcendental philosophy bring realism out of idealism, by materializing the laws of intelligence into laws of nature, or adds the material to the form.
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As the philosophy of nature brings idealism forth out of realism in that it spiritualizes the laws of nature into laws of intelligence or adds the formal to the material so does transcendental philosophy bring realism out of idealism by materializing the laws of intelligence into laws of nature or adds the material to the form