Most phonemes have no meaning.
But in other theories of meaning, the order of metaphysical determination is reversed.
Meaning is so much better than nothing, in that it defines “nothing” as everything that meaning is not.
Therefore, textual meaning is not identical to the authorial meaning.”
It takes secondary meaning to apply both before and after sentence meaning.
The word has a pleasant meaning if he likes them, an unpleasant meaning if he doesn’t.
On some readings of “differ in meaning”, any big difference in theory generates a difference in meaning.
If meaning is conventional, then the evolution of meaning becomes an instance of the evolution of conventions.
In the realm of philosophy of language, theories of sentence meaning depend on how word meaning is understood.
While much of the discussion about primary and secondary meaning is centered on words, there are significant implications for sentence meaning.
If the primary meaning is inappropriate in a given context, then one moves to a secondary meaning, an extension of the primary meaning.
(For more details about how Grice thought that sentence-meaning could be explained in terms of speaker-meaning, see the discussion of resultant procedures in the entry on Paul Grice.)
Both versions of meaning normativism, however, claim that the following is both necessary, and essential to, an expression e’s having meaning (for a speaker, or group of speakers, S at a time t):
If the meaning of a name is generated from the metalinguistic meaning of the constituent proper nominal, then names will accordingly have a metalinguistic meaning (most likely in the form of a rule of use).
The term ‘default meaning’ is used in a variety of ways in the literature, including statistically common interpretation, predictable meaning, salient meaning, or automatically retrieved meaning.
The flaw consists in conflating the metaphysics of meaning — the study of what constitutes the meaning of an utterance — and the epistemology of meaning — the study of how the hearer interprets the meaning of an utterance.
Among them are natural meaning, as in smoke means fire or those spots mean measles; conventional meaning, as in a red traffic light means stop or the skull and crossbones means danger; and intentional meaning, as in John means well or Frank means business.
First, he refines the analyses of utterer’s meaning and sentence meaning, primarily in the 1968 article, “Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning,” and the 1969 article, “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions.”
The two-layered view of utterance content consisting, according to Levinson, of a level of encoded meaning (sentence-meaning) and a level of inferential meaning (speaker’s or utterance-(token)-meaning), must be supplemented by a third intermediate layer of utterance-type-meaning which is not based “on direct computations on speaker-intentions but rather on general expectations about how language is normally used” (p. 22).
One needs to add the assumption that the function from the determinants of meaning to the meanings themselves is one-to-one (that is, not only does any change to a word's meaning require some change in the determinants of its meaning, but also that any change to the determinants of a word's meaning must produce a change to its meaning), and doing that will probably require something more like a “direct” argument, since it is unlikely that one could argue that the function from use to meaning had to be one-to-one without some sort of substantial account of how use determined meaning.
- the message that is intended or expressed or signified
Example: what is the meaning of this sentence
- rich in significance or implication
Example: a meaning look
- the idea that is intended
Example: What is the meaning of this proverb?
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One needs to add the assumption that the function from the determinants of meaning to the meanings themselves is one-to-one that is not only does any change to a word's meaning require some change in the determinants of its meaning but also that any change to the determinants of a word's meaning must produce a change to its meaning and doing that will probably require something more like a direct argument since it is unlikely that one could argue that the function from use to meaning had to be one-to-one without some sort of substantial account of how use determined meaning