Thus, Ockham is quite certain there are no metaphysically universal entities.
There are more metaphysically robust notions of fact in the current literature.
What sort of things, metaphysically speaking, are you and I and other human people?
Speaks (2017) responds by questioning whether the laws are metaphysically necessary.
So whether metaphysically necessary supervenience is “ontologically innocent” may well depend upon the case.
Thus, abstract mathematical objects are claimed to be epistemologically inaccessible and metaphysically problematic.
The claim that introspective access is both epistemically and metaphysically direct is most plausible for phenomenal states like pain.
If one accepts ontological commitment to worlds of any kind, then one faces the follow-up question: just what are they, metaphysically speaking?
We have already discussed the in-principle worry that phenomenal consciousness is not metaphysically sufficient for intentionality (see section 4.1).
It is metaphysically possible, however unlikely, that we could walk across a heath and find (something with the intrinsic features of) a watch that had “always been there.”
When we look for an explanation of why something is metaphysically possible or necessary we ultimately look to the essential properties or essences of the entities involved.
For it renders EXT into something trivial—it is obvious that Oscar’s water thoughts metaphysically imply a number of external conditions, e.g., that Oscar was born (McKinsey, 1994; 2002; 2007, Rowlands 2003).
A different line of response to this worry (Shoemaker 1984d, 2001) is to deny the Humean account of causation altogether, and contend that causal relations are themselves metaphysically necessary, but this remains a minority view.
(Perhaps a proposition’s being mathematically necessary can be defined as its being both metaphysically necessary and a mathematical truth (Fine 2002, 255), or as its being metaphysically necessary because it is a mathematical truth.)
That determinates characterize objects in respect of their determinables is indeed a key feature of determination, though there remains disagreement about how best to metaphysically articulate this feature (e.g., as involving shared determinables or not).
The descriptive view would thus be refuted either by (i) metaphysically possible instances of the kind C that do not possess the property complex D or by (ii) metaphysically possible items that do possess the property complex D without being instances of C.
…from the bare fact that some goings-on are Grounded in some others it hardly follows that the latter metaphysically explain the former in any interesting sense; nor does a bare Grounding claim itself constitute an explanation in either a metaphysical or epistemic sense. (2014: 553)
The first step is an argument that if the ethical properties strongly (or globally) metaphysically supervene on the base properties, then there is no metaphysically possible ethical difference between states that does not have a correlated base difference between the same states.
One possible answer is that it is meant to have a reading corresponding to metaphysical grounding, where metaphysical grounding is a non-causal explanatory relation on states of affairs, such that, if one state of affairs metaphysically grounds another state of affairs then it metaphysically necessitates it.
The nonreductive physicalist thinks that the metaphysically necessary supervenience of the mental on the physical means that mental properties are nothing over and above physical ones, and the believer in unrestricted mereological composition thinks that the metaphysically necessary supervenience of fusions on their parts means that fusions are nothing over and above those parts.
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The nonreductive physicalist thinks that the metaphysically necessary supervenience of the mental on the physical means that mental properties are nothing over and above physical ones and the believer in unrestricted mereological composition thinks that the metaphysically necessary supervenience of fusions on their parts means that fusions are nothing over and above those parts