Our moral conceptions, though, are based upon moral feelings.
Third, the entry assumes that moral knowledge entails (roughly) justified true moral belief.
Instead, moral responsibility as put forward by Kantians is by nature associated with individual moral agents.
They might, for example, doubt categorical or absolute moral beliefs without doubting weaker kinds of moral beliefs.
Moral generalists think morality is best understood in terms of moral principles; moral particularists deny this.
Moral skeptics can even believe that their moral beliefs are true by virtue of corresponding to an independent moral reality.
Opponents of such error theories often object that some moral beliefs must be true because some moral beliefs deny the truth of other moral beliefs.
These discussions pertained to moral objectivity, but moral relativism as a thesis explicitly distinguished from moral skepticism ordinarily was not in focus.
Since Kant holds moral virtue to be a trait grounded in moral principle, the boundary between non-moral and moral virtues could not be more sharp.
Accordingly, the close relations between moral reasoning, the moral facts, and moral theory do not eliminate moral reasoning as a topic of interest.
First, the outputs of the Reidian moral sense include not only moral conceptions, but also full-blooded moral beliefs with moral propositional content.
Moreover, moral nihilists’ explanations of our moral beliefs predict that we would hold exactly these moral beliefs, so the truth of its predictions can hardly refute moral nihilism.
Different versions of moral skepticism deny or doubt moral knowledge, justified moral belief, moral truth, moral facts or properties, and reasons to be moral.
Moreover, practical moral skeptics usually deny that there is always enough reason for moral action, whereas epistemological moral skeptics usually deny that there is ever an adequate reason for moral belief.
Error theorists and skeptics about moral truth-aptness disagree about the content of moral assertions, but they still agree that no substantive moral claim or belief is true, so they are both skeptics about moral truth.
Mark Rowlands (2012) argues that because animals can be have moral emotions, and that those moral emotions provide moral reasons for an animal’s actions, animals can engage in moral practice by being moral subjects.
Irrealist moral naturalists aim to account for moral discourse by offering naturalist accounts of the social and linguistic and practices that govern it, but without supposing that moral utterances report on moral facts with a substantial independent existence (Joyce 2015).
| cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, moral | emotion | fitting attitude theories of value | Hume, David: moral philosophy | metaethics | moral anti-realism | morality: and evolutionary biology | moral motivation | naturalism: moral | reasons for action: internal vs. external
Many moral beliefs—for example, concerning the moral irrelevance of sexual preference, the moral equality of persons of all races and nationalities, or moral obligations even to future generations in far away countries—are much more plausible candidates for being upshots of autonomous moral reflection and reasoning.
Such arguments are taken to support moral skepticism (according to which we cannot possess moral knowledge) or moral antirealism (for example, views that construe moral truths as functions of our evaluative attitudes, or expressivist views according to which moral judgments function to express attitudes, acceptance of norms, etc., rather than to represent moral facts, or error theoretic views according to which all moral judgments are false).
- psychological rather than physical or tangible in effect
Example: a moral victory
- the significance of a story or event
Example: the moral of the story is to love thy neighbor
- concerned with principles of right and wrong or conforming to standards of behavior and character based on those principles
Example: moral sense
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Such arguments are taken to support moral skepticism according to which we cannot possess moral knowledge or moral antirealism for example views that construe moral truths as functions of our evaluative attitudes or expressivist views according to which moral judgments function to express attitudes acceptance of norms etc rather than to represent moral facts or error theoretic views according to which all moral judgments are false