We now pass to the normative dimension of nationalism.
A normative theological voluntarist cannot, however, be a moral skeptic.
For the remainder of this article, by ‘reason’ we will always mean normative reason.
What it is for such normative facts to be normative just is that they require that you act in some way.
But all of these terms are ambiguous, in that they have normative (or “moral”) and non-normative (e.g., “predictive”) uses.
First, normative competence is “other-directed” in that “it makes certain normative characteristics of the agent present to others”.
Fourth, many important epistemological issues arise in the context of considering specific normative theories or types of normative theory.
To say that a state has authority in the normative sense is to say something normative about the relationship between the state and its subjects.
On the contrary, few analytical theories are altogether devoid of normative elements and no normative theory is ever devoid of analytical elements.
It is a normative view because it asserts that some normative state of affairs obtains—namely, the normative state of affairs its being obligatory to obey God.
In spite of the reluctance of many economists to view normative issues as part and parcel of their discipline, normative economics now represents an impressive body of literature.
We are dealing with a normative notion, and while some normative notions may be explainable in terms of others, we cannot express normative notions in non-normative terms.
Foucault’s refusal to engage in normative theorizing has normative implications; it allows one to see what has been obfuscated—for example, power’s productive functions—and thus reframe ethics by overthrowing previous normative presuppositions.
a so-called inferentialist semantics for normative terms: the meaning of normative terms is explained by identifying the kinds of inferences (for example, about means and ends) one must be making in order to count as employing normative concepts at all.
Aristotelian constructivism is a metaethical view about the nature of normative truths, according to which our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, but this reality is not independent of the exercise of moral and practical judgment (LeBar 2008: 182; 2013a,b).
On this account, a “P-corresponding normative attitude” is understood to be a judgment, emotional state, expectation, or other properly first personal normative belief that supports the principle P (e.g., Alice thinking most people should P would count as a normative attitude).
A problem, however, occurs with mixed sentences, which have both descriptive and normative components, and Prior comes up with a paradox: wherever we draw the distinction between non-normative and normative sentences, unexpected inferences from non-normative premises to normative conclusions may appear by a mere use of laws of classical propositional logic.
Schroeder’s response may succeed in providing a naturalist-friendly explanation of the “just too different” intuition, but it seems strange to say that the existence of numerous analytic relations between different normative concepts, combined with a lack of analytic relations between normative and natural concepts, should in any way work to support the thesis that the normative is natural.
So in Kd, p is obligatory iff p is necessitated by all normative demands being met, permissible iff p is compatible with all normative demands being met, impermissible iff p is incompatible with all normative demands, omissible iff p's negation is compatible with all normative demands, and optional iff p is compatible with all normative demands, and so is ~p.
The heart of Rosen’s challenge is an argument that we can characterize and clearly regiment a notion of normative necessity, which falls short of metaphysical necessity (i.e. at least some normative necessities are metaphysically contingent), while still being quite strong, in the sense that in any counterfactual where one considers how things would be if we altered some non-normative fact, we hold fixed the normative necessities.
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The heart of Rosens challenge is an argument that we can characterize and clearly regiment a notion of normative necessity which falls short of metaphysical necessity ie at least some normative necessities are metaphysically contingent while still being quite strong in the sense that in any counterfactual where one considers how things would be if we altered some non-normative fact we hold fixed the normative necessities