Museums display some objects all the time.
If there are nonexistent objects, then what kind of objects are they?
The earliest man-made objects were of stone, wood, bone, and earth.
Since cognitions do arise, there must be external objects as their intentional objects.
According to this position, fictitious objects are just a species of nonexistent objects.
Presumably one who denies the Umbrella View thinks that there are objects, and non-objects.
Ideal objects are atemporal; these are usually taken to be either general or individual objects.
That is, sums are distinct objects which share all of their parts with the commonsense objects they make up.
For Independence is meant to substantiate an analogy between mathematical objects and ordinary physical objects.
The target of such discussion is not simply audition’s intentional objects or proper (specific to audition) objects.
Like Parsons, Crittenden maintains that some objects do not exist and that fictional objects are such objects.
For both Locke and Reid, we are aware of objects as they are intrinsically only when our awareness is caused by the primary qualities of objects.
According to the first version regarding objects within a given world, PII-Objects, there are no qualitatively indiscernible objects within a single possible world.
The members of U are called standard sets, or standard objects; those in *U − U nonstandard sets or nonstandard objects: *U thus consists of both standard and nonstandard objects.
It may be tempting to think that fictional objects are non-actual possible objects, even though it is obvious that not all non-actual possible objects are fictional objects.
Some views about the natures of objects may seem to be at odds with common sense, for instance, the view that ordinary objects can’t survive the loss of any of their parts, or that ordinary objects are all mind-dependent.
The insight that the spatially relevant properties of objects are the properties that remain invariant when objects change position, or when we change position relative to the objects, is fundamental to Helmholtz’s later work on topology.
To account for the validity of BF, NE, and CBF, D is understood to include: (1) contingently concrete objects, (2) contingently nonconcrete objects, and, if there are such (3) necessarily concrete objects and (4) necessarily nonconcrete objects.
This typed structure of properties determines a layered universe of mathematical objects, starting from ground objects, proceeding to classes of ground objects, then to classes of ground objects and classes of ground objects, and so on.
But this would not be a psychologistic view, because on this view, the objects of mathematics would not be actual mental objects; they would be possible objects, which, presumably, are either abstract objects or objects of some other metaphysically dubious kind.
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