Supervenient properties are sometimes distinguished from emergent properties.
At heart, all a supervenience claim says is that A-properties covary with B-properties.
Now consider a version of ethical realism that takes ethical properties to be functional properties.
The natural properties, but not in general the unnatural properties, are relevant to the causal powers of things.
Representationalism (or intentionalism) is the thesis that phenomenal properties are determined by representational properties.
Rather, Davidson appears to be claiming that mental properties influence the causal powers of their subvenient physical properties.
An object’s consecutive properties are those properties that are somehow included or implied by the object’s constitutive properties.
In this claim, we can call the A-properties the supervening properties, and the B-properties the subvening or base properties.
Properties could not exist without objects to be properties of, but neither could substances exist without properties, so the dependence appears to be mutual.
Realists who are not naturalists believe semantic properties are real properties of computational states, but they are irreducible to non-semantic properties.
Not all philosophers acknowledge properties in their ontological inventory and even those who agree that properties exist often disagree about which properties there are.
To see why, distinguish, first, an object's temporary properties (i.e., the properties it has at some times of its existence and not at others) from its permanent properties.
If supervenience holds, psychological properties make a difference to the causal relations of an event, for they matter to the physical properties, and the physical properties matter to causal relations.
In practice, the Russellian content of a complex visual experience might involve a number of different objects having a conjunction of different properties: location properties, shape properties, color properties, and so on.
To borrow a phrase from Jackson (1998), however, it seems best to treat these properties as onlooker properties: given any set of physical properties, one might add onlooker properties without compromising the integrity of the set.
Extra-nuclear properties include ontological properties such as existence and being fictional, modal properties such as being possible, intentional properties such as being thought of by Socrates, and technical properties such as being complete.
Thus each fundamental constituent is complex: it has mental (or protomental) properties, it has physical properties, and it has these two sets of properties as a necessary consequence of its having a third set of properties—the neutral properties.
Hence, we have at least four distinct kinds of properties that are characterised by Lewis’s three characterisations: local properties, identity interior properties, metaphysical necessitation interior properties, and duplication preserving properties.
Multiple realizability of higher-level properties: The system’s higher-level properties are determined by its lower-level properties, but can be realized by numerous different configurations of them and hence cannot feasibly be redescribed in terms of lower-level properties.
Philosophers who argue that properties exist almost always do so because they think properties are needed to solve certain philosophical problems, and their views about the nature of properties are strongly influenced by the problems they think properties are needed to solve.
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