Stephen Evans’s book Faith Beyond Reason.
“As my Momma said, there’s a good reason and the real reason,” Ms.
Philosophy, he said, “is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason”; its true aim is both constructive (“to outline the system of all knowledge arising from pure reason”) and critical (“to expose the illusions of a reason that forgets its limits”).
A normative reason is a reason (for someone) to act—in T.
For this reason, faith and reason can find themselves in tension.
The reason is in this sense not relativized to the agent for whom it is a reason.
That I opened the door is a reason for thinking that I used the key, not a reason why.
Again, accounts of acting for a reason and of reason-explanation often appeal to causation.
It is precisely because the reason is causally related to the action that the action can be explained by reference to the reason.
There, Gersonides upholds the primacy of reason, attributing to Maimonides the position that “we must believe what reason has determined to be true.
One obvious implication is that reason cannot be the motive to moral action; if reason cannot motivate any sort of action, it cannot motivate moral action.
There is much to be said about this image of reason, which ascribes to reason the same exhaustiveness, dominance, and omnipresence that traditional theologies ascribe to God.
According to Himmelfarb, there is for Burke good reason—reason itself—to praise prejudice, which exists on a continuum with theoretical reason (Himmelfarb 2008b).
Its main topic is metaphysics because, for Kant, metaphysics is the domain of reason – it is “the inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered systematically” (Axx) – and the authority of reason was in question.
The terms “agential reason”, “the agent’s normative reason”, “subjective (normative) reasons”, “the agent’s operative reason” and “possessed reasons” are sometimes also used to capture this notion of a reason.
Second, public reason might be inconclusive with regard to some question, that is, a plurality of different answers might be apparently justified by appeal to public reason, and public reason alone cannot clearly tell us which answer is correct or the most reasonable alternative.
Thus the critical examination of reason in thinking (science) is undertaken in the Critique of Pure Reason, that of reason in willing (ethics) in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and that of reason in feeling (aesthetics) in the Critique of Judgment (1790).
We call this the ‘reason-statement-based version’ of the distinction because it holds that whether a reason is agent-relative depends on whether a full statement of the reason itself (forget about its “general form”) involves pronominal back-reference to the agent for whom it is a reason.
Although that maxim was intended to reconcile reason and revelation—indeed, Locke called reason “natural revelation” and revelation “natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God”—over the course of the subsequent 200 years, reason repeatedly judged that alleged revelations had no scientific or intellectual standing.
Notwithstanding the complexities already mentioned (one person’s reason may not be another’s; a reason R doesn’t have to be presented by or to an individual i in order for R to be i’s reason to endorse L; etc.), the PJP requires that individual members of a public P have reason to endorse a principle L if that principle is to be considered legitimate.
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Notwithstanding the complexities already mentioned one persons reason may not be anothers a reason R doesnt have to be presented by or to an individual i in order for R to be is reason to endorse L etc the PJP requires that individual members of a public P have reason to endorse a principle L if that principle is to be considered legitimate