They don’t know the reasons.
A rational agent responds voluntarily to her reasons.
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“To put the point bluntly,” he wrote, “the federal judiciary has no authority to stick its nose into the question whether it is good policy to include a citizenship question on the census or whether the reasons given by Secretary Ross for that decision were his only reasons or his real reasons.”
So the same may be true for motivating and explanatory reasons.
At issue here has solely been one’s epistemic reasons for holding a belief.
What should citizens do, religious or secular, when they cannot identify these reasons?
But the way moral reasons work is probably very different from the way that other reasons work.
The different versions of reasons internalism are philosophically interesting for a variety of reasons.
These “primary reasons” are, in effect, explanatory reasons: reasons that explain actions.
Another way to capture degrees of moral status is to vary not the strength of the reasons but which reasons apply.
A reasons-responsiveness theory turns upon dispositional features of an agent’s relation to reasons issuing in freely willed action.
To see this, we explore two features of Scanlon’s use of reasons: rejection must be reasonable, and reasons are not limited to well-being.
The reasons for the surviving duties also include the reasons that are necessary for showing that a particular person had the moral right.
Enabling factor explanations also involve the agent’s reasons since they concern the factors which render the agent’s reasons efficacious.
Among those who hold that normative reasons are facts, some hold that facts are true propositions and hence that reasons are also true propositions (Darwall 1983; Smith 1994; Scanlon 1998).
Philosophers concerned with the Central Problem have mainly directed their criticisms at the Humean Theory of Reasons, but in fact any Actual State version of reasons internalism will lead to a structurally similar problem.
Reasons that seem to derive from desires can arguably be more plausibly explained by pleasure, which can also serve to explain reasons that desire cannot explain: reasons deriving from pleasures that the agent does not actually desire.
This line of argument has not yet received much attention; opponents may reasonably question whether motivation by reasons must always be voluntary (this seems implausible in the case of theoretical reasons, or reasons for belief, for example—see section 2.2 below for this analogy), and also whether voluntary behavior must be caused by desire.
If this account is right, then the reasons relevant to God’s decision about which world to actualize are not exhausted by the first-order reasons constituted by the value of the worlds actualized; these reasons also include second-order reasons, reasons that direct God not to make the choice by comparing worlds’ first-order value.
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If this account is right then the reasons relevant to Gods decision about which world to actualize are not exhausted by the first-order reasons constituted by the value of the worlds actualized these reasons also include second-order reasons reasons that direct God not to make the choice by comparing worlds first-order value