So far we have focussed on individual representations.
Logical structure is just one possible paradigm for the structure of mental representations.
As we saw, the semantic account needs to specify which representations are relevant to computation.
The first, concerning retrieved representations, is the question of the nature of the objects of memory.
Attitudes towards unitarily inequivalent representations differ drastically in the philosophical literature.
For the psyche’s self-preservings and the representations are one and the same, just in different relations (SW V: 401):
Logically structured mental representations (LOGIC): Some mental representations have logical structure.
Pictorial representations capture visual and spatial information in a much more usable form than lengthy verbal descriptions.
Accordingly, the representations that figure in Sue’s beliefs would be composed of more basic representations.
These representations are thought of as similar to expressions in a natural language; indeed, Fodor describes these mental representations as a “language of thought.”
The core of GG is the reductive claim that all representations owe their status as representations to a privileged core of fundamental representations.
The imaginative or cogitative faculty combines and divides representations collected in the phantasia to make new representations, which might not have any real object corresponding to them.
Peacocke himself doesn’t go so far as to argue that mental representations are explanatorily idle, but he does think that mental representations are too fine-grained for philosophical purposes.
If Kant meant that appearances are representations considered with respect to their objective reality why didn’t he simply say that, rather than stating that they are a species of representations?
Thus, the representational theory of sensory qualities cannot be purely representational, but must appeal to some further factor, to distinguish visual representations from other sorts of representations of redness.
In many of the texts in which Kant identifies appearances with (a species of) representation, he also claims that representations are representations of appearances, i.e., that representations are representations of objects, appearances.
Having shown how incipient concepts arise as the strong, common nodes of reproduced series of similar representations, he proceeds to show how, given such nodular representations, they can be definitely discriminated into subject and predicate, viz. a judgment (Stout 1888b: 478).
At least in her earlier work, Millikan's theory of content focussed heavily on the “consumers” of representations, where the consumers of representations are the systems that have historically used the mapping between the representations and their contents to perform their (the consumers') proper functions.
Compositionality of mental representations (COMP): Mental representations have a compositional semantics: complex representations are composed of simple constituents, and the meaning of a complex representation depends upon the meanings of its constituents together with the constituency structure into which those constituents are arranged.
Such representations and processes come in two forms: there are representations and processes that represent or respond to body, such as a perception of bodily movement, and there are representations and processes that affect the body, such as motor commands. (2009: 420; for relevant discussion of various senses of embodiment, see Alsmith and Vignemount 2012)
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Such representations and processes come in two forms there are representations and processes that represent or respond to body such as a perception of bodily movement and there are representations and processes that affect the body such as motor commands 2009 420 for relevant discussion of various senses of embodiment see Alsmith and Vignemount 2012