Do something to it.
Suppose something eternal observes something as temporally present.
In the magical tiny bowls, there’s something salty, something tangy, something spicy.
Something ravishing, something ribald, something risible, something old, something even older.
But they are looking for something important, something critical, that was lost.
But, if I did hear it, I would do something about it, say something: “That cannot be done.
(I know a priori that something exists because I know a priori that I exist and know this entails ‘Something exists’.)
"I want to create a surprise that you don't expect: something elegant, something sharp, something silky, something crunchy."
Sometimes you might learn something about how other people behave, and sometimes you might learn something about yourself, such as a better way to react to situation.
In Tellybox, Alicia and I have been working on refactoring and bug-fixing Something Something and adding in voice for it (you can now ask for example for "Something funny".
Everyone is going to draw lines for you, especially when they think you should have achieved something or proved something or become something by a specific time.
“Here we were trying to do something good by conserving water and still farming with the intention of producing something with exceptional flavor, and no one was buying them,” she said.
Many stumble on omission bias: “We would rather not do something and have something bad happen, than do something and have something bad happen,” explained Alison M.
“When I was campaigning, you never wanted to say something you didn't believe, or say something that later you're going to deny, but at the same time, you understand that you've got to get elected to get something done,” said Edgar, a Republican from Charleston.
An activity should include at least two senses –seeing something (visual), hearing something related to what is seen (auditory), some form of related movement of muscles, for example speaking or writing (kinaesthetic), and touching or feeling something (tactile).
Supposition and copulation are symmetrically related to each other; ‘supposition’ is “an ordering of the understanding of something under something else” while ‘copulation’ is “an ordering of the understanding of something over something else” (Kretzmann 1966, p. 105).
(D) If S believes he remembers having perceived something to have F, then the proposition that he does remember having perceived something to have F, as well as the proposition that he did perceive that something had F, and the proposition that something was F, is acceptable for S.
used He used to do something, not he did use to do something and certainly not he did used to do something (double imperfect); a column said “high street shops did, it’s true, used to be more varied” – something like “high street shops certainly used to be more varied” would have been better
(E) If F is a sensible characteristic, and S believes he remembers having perceived something to have F, then the proposition that he does remember having perceived something to have F, as well as the proposition that he did perceive that something had F, and the proposition that something was F, is reasonable for S.
This section focuses on three main claims that might be argued to be at the core of phenomenlogical theorizing about meaning acts: (i) to mean something is to mean something which is intuitively absent (i.e., which is not seen or imagined); (ii) to mean something and to present something are not species of a common genus and, therefore, they cannot “fuse” (i.e., presentations cannot “fulfil” meaning acts); and (iii) to mean something is a conceptual act, whereas to present—i.e., to perceive or imagine—something is non-conceptual.
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This section focuses on three main claims that might be argued to be at the core of phenomenlogical theorizing about meaning acts i to mean something is to mean something which is intuitively absent ie which is not seen or imagined ii to mean something and to present something are not species of a common genus and therefore they cannot fuse ie presentations cannot fulfil meaning acts and iii to mean something is a conceptual act whereas to present—ie to perceive or imagine—something is non-conceptual