So, for example, Newton's theory is deemed to be no more truthlike, no closer to the whole truth, than the tautology.
He asks us to imagine that the scientists in a specific area of physics have found the maximally truthlike theory C*.
Our interest in the concept of truthlikeness is presumably rooted in the value of lighting on highly truthlike theories.
By making these theories more and more verisimilar, that is, truthlike, scientific knowledge grows over time (e.g., Popper 1963).
Amongst true theories, then, it seems that the more true sentences that are entailed, the closer we get to T, hence the more truthlike.
Rather, the privilege is that they are more truthlike than past theories because they have had more predictive power than past theories.
The focus of this strategy was on rebutting the claim that the truth of current theories implies that past theories cannot be deemed truthlike.
It yields the result that no falsehood is closer to the truth than any other, and no falsehood is closer to the truth than the least truthlike truth.
But whether an answer A contains complete answers that are close to the actual world — that is, whether A is truthlike — is clearly a world-dependent matter.
It has been argued, however, that Doppelt cannot explain the novel predictive success of past theories without arguing that they had truthlike constituents (cf.
However, it is also the case that based on their greater success, we are more justified to take newer theories to be more likely to be truthlike than older ones.
This numerical equivalent of Hilpinen's proposal renders all propositions comparable for truthlikeness, and some falsehoods it deems more truthlike than some truths.
Unless there are past successful theories which are warrantedly deemed not to be truthlike, premise (B) cannot be sustained and the warrant-removing reductio of (A) fails.
In any case, a critical question is: can some false-but-rigorously-empirically-successful theories justifiably be deemed truthlike from the point of view of successor theories?
This quantitative version (call it min-max-average) of Hilpinen's account renders all propositions comparable for truthlikeness, and some falsehoods it deems more truthlike than some truths.
Academic Skeptics attempted to avoid this objection by arguing that though skepticism precluded living by the truth, since the truth could not be known, nevertheless one could live by the truthlike or plausible.
Argument (L) above aimed to “discredit the claim that there is an explanatory connection between empirical success and truth-likeness” which would warrant the realist view that current successful theories are truthlike.
Popper’s explication used the cumulative idea that the more truthlike theory should have (in the sense of set-theoretical inclusion) more true consequences and less false consequences, but it turned out that this comparison is not applicable to pairs of false theories.
With this restriction to relevant consequences we can basically apply Popper's definitions: one theory is more truthlike than another if its relevant truth content is larger and its relevant falsity content no larger; or its relevant falsity content is smaller, and its relevant truth content is no smaller.
According to min-sum-average: all propositions are commensurable for truthlikeness; the full principle of the value of content for truths holds provided the content factor gets non-zero weight; the Truth has greater truthlikeness than any other proposition provided all non-actual worlds are some distance from the actual world; some false propositions are closer to the truth than others; the principle of the value of content for falsehoods is appropriately repudiated, provided the truth factor gets some weight; if A is false, the truth content of A is more truthlike than A itself, again provided the truth factor gets some weight. min-sum-average thus seems like a consistent and appealing compromise between content and likeness approaches.
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According to min-sum-average all propositions are commensurable for truthlikeness the full principle of the value of content for truths holds provided the content factor gets non-zero weight the Truth has greater truthlikeness than any other proposition provided all non-actual worlds are some distance from the actual world some false propositions are closer to the truth than others the principle of the value of content for falsehoods is appropriately repudiated provided the truth factor gets some weight if A is false the truth content of A is more truthlike than A itself again provided the truth factor gets some weight min-sum-average thus seems like a consistent and appealing compromise between content and likeness approaches