many possible worlds.
The worlds we are interested in are not in there.
But not all objects of the domain exist in all worlds.
The worlds that such fictions describe are non-normal worlds.
So defined, non-actual worlds, i.e., worlds that fail to obtain, can still actually exist.
Worlds are divided into two categories: normal worlds and non-normmal worlds.
Such worlds appear to be logically more structured than fully anarchic “open” worlds (section 5.3).
And, just as ersatz possible worlds needn’t be constructed in this way, nor need ersatz impossible worlds.
A second version of PII, PII-Worlds, concerns possible worlds themselves rather than the individuals within them.
Supporters of impossible worlds disagree over their metaphysical nature, just as supporters of possible worlds do.
Compatibilism is the thesis that there are free will worlds and free will worlds include deterministic worlds.
If variation in empty worlds can be sustained by differences in the laws that apply to them, there will be infinitely many empty worlds.
The other worlds strategy provides the following solution to the paradox of contradiction: The round square exists only in impossible worlds.
If all A-worlds are B-worlds and all B-worlds are C-worlds, then all A-worlds are C-worlds.
But, for most realists about possible worlds, quantification over maximal possibilities requires or is simply equivalent to quantification over possible worlds.
In some of the many worlds the older system will be in the 3 state, let us call them A-worlds, and in some worlds, B-worlds, it will be in the 3 state.
However, most contemporary philosophers would seek to deploy the explanatorily fruitful possible worlds framework while distancing themselves from full-blown realism about possible worlds themselves (see the entry on possible worlds).
Use of a fiction of impossible worlds is unlikely to seem too extravagant for many modal fictionalists, but it might also provide a mechanism for non-fictionalists about possible worlds to talk of impossible worlds without the extra theoretical costs they fear.
This is what happens in (4L), but it does not happen in (3L), where there are two existential quantifiers over worlds in the scope of the outside universal quantifier, but where the worlds existentially quantified over are not asserted to be “in” any of the worlds w.
The likeness theorist has two initial tasks: firstly, making it plausible that there is an appropriate likeness or distance function on worlds; and secondly, extending likeness between individual worlds to likeness of propositions (i.e. sets of worlds) to the actual world.
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