Consider the following list from Yablo (2000a):
Of course, what Yablo says here is controversial.
Such a theory has been developed in (Yablo, 2014).
By commonsense standards, Yablo contends, the following type of conditional is apriori true:
However, of these authors, only Yablo uses the paradox of existence to motivate fictionalism.
The precise characterisation of what it means to be a “Yablo-like structure” is still discussed.
Yablo (1993b) has argued that a more complicated kind of multi-sentence paradox produces a Liar without circularity.
According to Thomasson, this is obscure, and unless Yablo can say something more about this, we ought not to accept his view.
Relying on pioneering work by Kendall Walton (1990), Yablo argues that pretense can serve serious practical and theoretical purposes.
Yablo (2005, 2002a, 2002b) also develops a view like this (and it’s worth noting that his view here draws heavily on the work of Walton (1990)).
Melia, Yablo, and Balaguer all argue that the view is independently superior to Field’s view because it fits better with actual scientific practice.
This is a bitter pill to swallow, though it may seem less bitter the less importance is placed on literalness in communication (See Yablo 2001, p. 85).
Since asymmetrical necessitation now serves as a common minimal characterization of determination, it’s worth seeing how Yablo motivates this approach.
Walton’s explanation of the cause of the inability in terms of violation of a dependency relation inspired other accounts (Yablo 2002, Weatherson 2004, Stear 2015).
See the entry mental causation for an introductory overview, and see Burge (2007), Rescorla (2014a), and Yablo (1997, 2003) for representative externalist discussion.
See Yablo 1992 for an objection to the exclusion argument, to the effect that a mental event is ‘better qualified than its physical basis for the role of cause’ (p. 279).
An approach like this is the FDE-based (transparent) truth theory discussed in Dunn 1969 (see Other Internet Resources); Gupta and Belnap 1993; Leitgeb 1999; Visser 1984; Woodruff 1984; Yablo 1993a; and—in effect—Brady 1989.
Nonetheless, such a ‘conventionalist’ view of logical truth (and along with it, analytic truth) has been argued against by, for example, Quine, Sober, Yablo and Boghossian, and it no longer enjoys the popularity that it had in Carnap’s time (Quine 1936; Yablo 1992; Boghossian 1996; Sober 2000).
Since then, the view has been developed—in a few different ways—by Balaguer (1996a, 1998a, 2001, 2009), Rosen (2001), Yablo (2002a, 2002b, 2005), Leng (2005a, 2005b, 2010), and Bueno (2009), though as will become clear below, one might question whether Bueno and Yablo are best interpreted as fictionalists.
Yablo does go beyond asymmetric necessitation in considering how (token, particular) events—the assumed relata of the causal relation—might stand in the determination relation; his approach appeals to the notion of essence of an event, and to the idea that the essence of one such event might be included in or subsumed by the essence of another:
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Yablo does go beyond asymmetric necessitation in considering how token particular events—the assumed relata of the causal relation—might stand in the determination relation his approach appeals to the notion of essence of an event and to the idea that the essence of one such event might be included in or subsumed by the essence of another